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Abstract 
[Excerpt] In the literature, much attention has been paid to a number of aspects of inequality including the 
distinction between relative and absolute inequality, axiomatization of inequality, the Lorenz criterion for 
inequality comparisons, properties of various inequality measures, and inequality decomposition. In no 
way do I wish to argue with the main results derived in these areas. Rather, my purpose here is to add to 
the theory of inequality measurement by dealing with one aspect of inequality which has been largely 
ignored by economists and by others. This is the question of how inequality changes - in particular, 
whether it increases, decreases, or remains unchanged - when income grows in specified ways. 
The balance of this chapter deals with two distinct conceptual entities, "inequality" and "inequality 
measures." The next section analyzes how "inequality" might be said to change under various types of 
economic growth and explores the foundations for alternative views. One approach in terms of "elitism of 
the rich" and "isolation of the poor" is then described. The following section looks into the behavior of 
"inequality measures" and the relationship between "inequality measures" and "inequality," and a final 
section draws some conclusions. 
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I first met Aldi Hagenaars at the World Econometric Society Congress in 
Cambridge, Massachusetts in 1985. At that time, we had a long discus-
sion about the question posed in the title of this chapter. The driving 
force behind Aldi's research program became clear to me then: a 
profound concern with people's feelings about their economic well-being 
accompanied by the quest to devise measures that reflect those under-
lying feelings. 
This chapter follows that tradition. My own research program has 
dealt with the twin questions of who benefits how much from economic 
growth and why. Before answering these questions, it is necessary to 
decide what measure to take to the data to determine if economic growth 
is welfare-enhancing. For many people, one component of a social 
welfare judgment is the extent of income inequality. 
There is no shortage of inequality measures (Gini coefficient, Theil 
index, Atkinson index, etc.). The task is to decide what we mean by 
"inequality" and then to determine which, if any, of the available 
measures behave as "inequality" does. 
The literature offers two principal ways of relating social welfare to 
the inequality of income.1 One, due to Kolm (1966) and Atkinson 
(1970), first constructs a social welfare function defined on the space of 
incomes 
W=W(yuyi,...,yn) (10.1) 
then defines the equally distributed income as the amount of income 
which, if equally distributed would yield the same social welfare as the 
actual distribution, and finally measures inequality as the gap between 
the actual mean income y and the equally distributed income y* 
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I = I-(y*/y) 
Another way of taking the level of national income and the inequality of 
its distribution into account in welfare judgments is to rank income 
distributions in terms of the mean income level Y, income inequality / 
and perhaps other things: 
W=f(Y,I,...), dW/df>0, dW/dKO 
Ranking income distributions in terms of income level and income 
inequality is common practice in a whole host of empirical studies of 
"growth and equity." This practice receives abundant theoretical 
support, for instance, in Sen (1973), Blackorby and Donaldson (1977, 
1984), Fields (1979), Ebert (1987), and Lambert (1989). Schur-concave 
social welfare functions provide one justification for this practice; 
another is diminishing marginal utility of identical interpersonally com-
parable utility functions. 
To be able to rank income distributions in this way, we must determine 
how the inequality of one distribution compares to that of another, 
which means that the primitive concept of "inequality" must be made 
precise. Amartya Sen (1973, pp. 2, 3) has written: 
there are some advantages in . . . try[ing] to catch the extent of inequality in some 
objective sense . . . so that one can distinguish between (a) "seeing" more or less 
inequality, and (b) "valuing" it more or less in ethical terms . . . There is, 
obviously, an objective element in this notion: a fifty-fifty division of a cake 
between two persons is clearly more equal in some straightforward sense than 
giving all to one and none to the other. [First emphasis Sen's, second and third 
emphases mine.] 
It is precisely this objective sense of "seeing" what inequality is which I 
shall adopt in this chapter in the context of inequality comparisons. 
In the literature, much attention has been paid to a number of aspects 
of inequality including the distinction between relative and absolute 
inequality, axiomatization of inequality, the Lorenz criterion for in-
equality comparisons, properties of various inequality measures, and 
inequality decomposition. In no way do I wish to argue with the main 
results derived in these areas. Rather, my purpose here is to add to the 
theory of inequality measurement by dealing with one aspect of in-
equality which has been largely ignored by economists2 and by others.3 
This is the question of how inequality changes - in particular, whether it 
increases, decreases, or remains unchanged - when income grows in 
specified ways.4 
The balance of this chapter deals with two distinct conceptual entities, 
"inequality" and "inequality measures." The next section analyzes how 
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"inequality" might be said to change under various types of economic 
growth and explores the foundations for alternative views. One approach 
in terms of "elitism of the rich" and "isolation of the poor" is then 
described. The following section looks into the behavior of "inequality 
measures" and the relationship between "inequality measures" and 
"inequality," and a final section draws some conclusions. 
How does inequality change with economic growth? 
In this chapter, inequality is analyzed on the space of "incomes" among 
"persons," ruling out multiple goods and problems of aggregation. The 
analysis proceeds axiomatically, following a long tradition which dates 
back at least to Pigou (1912) and Dalton (1920) and has been accepted by 
many others ever since.5 It holds that whenever a transfer of income is 
made from a person6 who is relatively poor to another who is relatively 
rich, inequality increases. Notice two things about this way of conceptua-
lizing the primitive concept "inequality." First it is in terms of conditional 
"if . . . then" statements. Second, the answer to the question "what is 
inequality?" is sought by looking at inequality orderings on pairs of 
distributions, addressing the related question "when is one distribution 
more equal than another?" I shall follow this practice and seek to clarify 
the meaning of "inequality" by formulating a series of conditional 
statements on binary comparisons. 
Let the economy consist of n "persons," total population being 
assumed fixed. Let <& be the share of persons having income yH and 
1 - <fr the share having income J L ( < }>.&)• Analyzing this restricted 
domain is helpful in forming precise views on the meaning of inequality 
before moving on to analyze inequality on the more general domain of 
incomes, a task left for the future. 
Throughout the rest of this chapter, we shall use the notation 
$ = nH/n and & = YH/YL whenever 4? € (0,1).7 The term "increase in 
0 " shall be understood as signifying an increase in YH/YL V* e (0,1). 
In the two-income world, income growth can take place by increasing 
YH, YL, or 3>, or by some combination of these. A simple example shows 
why inequality rankings are sometimes difficult to make when incomes 
are growing, even in so simple a world. 
Consider an economy consisting of six individuals with an initial 
distribution of income [1,1,1,1,1,6]. Now suppose the economy experi-
ences income growth of $5. The change in inequality depends on how 
that $5 is distributed. 
First let the entire $5 go to the rich person. We have little difficulty in 
ranking the new distribution [1,1,1,1,1,11] as more unequal than the old. 
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Suppose instead that the $5 of income growth is divided equally 
among all the low income persons, resulting in a new distribution 
[2,2,2,2,2,6]. Once again, the ranking is likely to be uncontroversial: the 
new distribution may be said to be more equal than the old. 
Consider a third possibility: that the $5 of income growth produces an 
income gain for just one of the low income persons.8 Compare the two 
income distributions 
7i = [1,1,1,1,1,6] 
and 
y2 = [1,1,1,1,6,6] 
Which is more equal, Y\ or Y219 The rest of this chapter seeks an answer. 
A natural starting point would be Lorenz curve comparisons. One 
income distribution is said to Lorenz-dominate another if the first 
distribution's Lorenz curve is somewhere above and nowhere below that 
of the second. The Lorenz criteria for relating the inequality of two 
distributions consist of several parts: 
(i) If two distributions X, Y e, Z have the same Lorenz curves Lx and 
Ly, then they are equally unequal {=£) by the Lorenz criterion, i.e. 
Lx = LY =• X =L Y 
(ii) If distribution X Lorenz dominates distribution Y, then X is more 
equal than Y by the Lorenz criterion (L): 
LxyLY=>X^LY 
(iii) If the Lorenz curves of X and Y cross, then the inequality of the two 
distributions cannot be compared using the Lorenz criterion alone. 
Together, these are termed ranking hi-10 
When economic growth causes the income distribution to change from 
Y\ = [1,1,1,1,1,6] to Y2 = [1,1,1,1,6,6], we may calculate the cumula-
tive income shares Cum Yx = [1/11,2/11,3/11,4/11,5/11,1] and Cum 
Y2 = [1/16,2/16,3/16,4/16,8/16,1] and note that their Lorenz curves 
cross. Therefore the two distributions' relative inequalities cannot be 
ranked on the basis of the Lorenz properties alone. Likewise, in a 
sequence of income distributions whereby an economy progresses from 
r 1 = [1,1,1,1,1,6] to Y2 = [1,1,1,1,6,6] to r 3 = [1,1,1,6,6,6] to 
Yi, = [1,1,6,6,6,6] to 75 = [1,6,6,6,6,6], all of the associated Lorenz 
curves cross each other. If we want to say how the inequalities of the 
different distributions compare, we must go beyond the Lorenz criteria 
considered thus far and appeal to additional properties. 
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One way of sharpening our views about what inequality is is to look at 
the sequence of distributions from Y\ through Y5 and see what we 
"see."11 From simple eyeballing of the sequence Y\ through Y5, many 
different patterns emerge as plausible possibilities. It might be said that 
inequality decreases monotonically, increases monotonically, follows a 
U-shaped path, follows an inverted U-shaped path, or even remains 
unchanged. This does not exhaust the possible patterns. 
Experimental evidence confirms the diversity of views for a similar 
thought experiment. Amiel and Co well (1992) asked more than 1,000 
university students to compare the inequality of two distributions 
^ = [5,5,5,10] 
and 
B =[5,5,10,10] 
40 percent judged A as more unequal, 56 percent judged B as more 
unequal, and 4 percent judged them equally unequal. When asked to 
compare 
B = [5,5,10,10] 
with 
C = [5,10,10,10] 
57 percent judged B as more unequal, 40 percent judged C as more 
unequal, and 3 percent judged them equally unequal. Furthermore, in 
three-way comparisons, by far the most common judgment was to deem 
[5, 5, 10, 10] as less unequal than both [5, 5, 5, 10] and [5,10,10,10], a view 
consistent with the U-shaped pattern. 
In addition, Amiel and Cowell's respondents were asked about their 
views on what I have here called the high income sector-enlargement 
process. Specifically, the question asked was: 
Suppose there is a society consisting of n people. There is one rich person 
and n— 1 identical poor people. One by one, some of those who were poor 
acquire the same income as the rich person, so that eventually there are 
n — 1 (identical) rich people and just one poor person. Please circle the 
appropriate response: 
Inequality increases continuously. (7.5%) 
Inequality decreases continuously. (20.5%) 
Inequality at first increases and then decreases. (19.9%) 
Inequality at first decreases and then increases. (36.7%) 
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Inequality remains the same throughout. (11.2%) 
None of the above. (4.1%) 
(The frequency distribution of valid responses is given in 
brackets). 
Here, as well, the U-shaped pattern is the most common. 
At this point, I would invite the reader to consider his or her own 
rankings of the inequality of Y\ versus Y2 versus F3 versus F4 versus F5, 
of A versus B versus C, and of the high income sector-enlargement 
process described in the previous paragraph. 
Justifying alternative patterns in terms of "elitism of the rich" and 
"isolation of the poor" 
If you had trouble making the inequality comparisons asked for above, it 
may be because you lack a framework for moving beyond Lorenz 
comparisons. This section may help in that regard. 
A philosopher, Temkin (1986), has analyzed essentially the same 
process, different only in that he has total income falling rather than 
rising. Temkin's analysis is in terms of individual complaints - how 
serious the inequality in a situation is from the standpoint of particular 
individuals in that situation. Alternative principles (additive, weighted 
additive, and maximin) and referents (relative to the average, relative to 
the best-off person, and relative to all those better off) lead plausibly, in 
his view, to most of the various patterns raised above. 
In an earlier paper (Fields, 1987), I adopted a different approach, 
which I also take here. Rather than weighing "individual complaints," I 
look at the question from a societal point of view. The specific way in 
which I now prefer to do this is with reference to two concepts - "elitism 
of the rich" and "isolation of the poor" - which are developed formally 
in Fields (1993). 
Briefly put, elitism of the rich (ER) is the following idea. When one 
person has a high income (Sj^) and everybody else has a low income 
($yL each), the one rich person may be thought to have a very elite 
position. In this case the economy may be said to have a high degree of 
elitism of the rich. Now let a second person acquire a high income, all 
others' incomes remaining the same (<& increases). Because each of the 
rich now has to share his elitist position with someone else, the two rich 
persons together might be regarded as less elite than one person was 
when he alone was rich. Thus, elitism of the rich falls. If a third person is 
enriched, elitism of the rich might be thought to fall further, but not by 
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Figure 10.1 Elitism of the rich 
as much as when the second person was enriched. In general, the larger 
the fraction rich, the smaller is elitism of the rich and the smaller is the 
change in elitism of the rich for a given increase in size of the high 
income group. When everybody is rich, there no longer is any ehtism of 
the rich. 
Elitism of the rich also varies with the ratio of high incomes to low 
incomes (©). Holding the number of persons in the two income groups 
constant, if the amount received by each high income person increases or 
if the amount received by each low income person decreases, elitism of 
the rich should increase. 
Figure 10.1 summarizes how elitism of the rich varies with 3? and ©. 
Isolation of the poor (IP) may be denned as a reciprocal notion to 
elitism of the rich. When everyone in an economy is equally poor, there 
is no isolation of the poor, because there are no rich from whom to be 
isolated. When one person escapes poverty, isolation of the poor is 
created. As the number with high incomes increases, those who are left 
behind may be regarded, as a group, as increasingly isolated. For this 
reason, isolation of the poor may be viewed as increasing at an 
increasing rate as the high income group expands. Finally, when just 
one person is poor, it can be argued that that one person is very isolated 
from everyone else, at which point isolation of the poor attains a 
maximum. Now, holding the numbers in the two groups constant any 
increase in the ratio between high and low incomes (0) should increase 
isolation of the poor. These properties of isolation of the poor are 
shown in Figure 10.2. 
From these concepts of elitism of the rich and isolation of the poor, we 
may derive various inequality patterns. Those observers who wish to 
view inequality solely in terms of elitism of the rich would see inequality 




High e • * 
\ • • I 











IP = isolation of the poor 
Figure 10.2 Isolation of the poor 
as falling continuously on the interval $ e (0,1) for any given 0 . The 
higher is 0 , the higher is inequality. This class, shown in figure 10.3, will 
be termed the / class. 
Others may wish to view inequality solely in terms of isolation of the 
poor. These observers would see inequality as rising continuously on the 
interval <& e (0,1) for any given 0 . A higher 0 implies more inequality. 
Figure 10.4 depicts this class, denoted the I+ class. 
Many observers hold the view that inequality consists of both elitism of 
the rich and isolation of the poor. How might these notions be combined 
on their common domain, the open interval (0,1)? 
Elitism of the rich and isolation of the poor need to be expressed in 
comparable units, which may be done by postulating that for any 
* , £ £ ( * ) = / P ( l - $ ) . 
Next, elitism of the rich and isolation of the poor need to be combined 
in some plausible way. Suppose equal weight is given to each. The 
simplest such mixing function, defined on the open interval (0,1), the 
common domain of ER(-) and IP(-), is 
/ (#, 0) = (ER + IP)/2 
Alternatively, unequal weights may be posited by using a linear mixing 
function: 
/(•) = w ER{-) + (1 - w) //»(•), w>0, wjLl-w 
Define the Imin class to be those /(•) rankings which are U-shaped as 3? 
varies on the open interval (0,1) for a given 0 , and which lie on higher 
contours for higher 0 , as shown in figure 10.5; denote those which also 
are symmetric with a unique minimum at 0 = 1/2 as the symmetric 7m,„ 





















Figure 10.3 The 7_ class of inequality rankings 
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Figure 10.4 The /+ class of inequality rankings 
class. Fields (1993) proves that the preceding properties with equal 
weights generate the symmetric Jmin class and these properties with 
unequal weights generate a ranking which is a member of the /m,„ class 
but not the symmetric Imi„ class. 
Note two things. First, given /(•) = w ER(-) + (1 + w)IP(-), for w = 1, 
we have the /_ pattern shown in figure 10.3, and for w = 0 , the /+ 
pattern shown in figure 10.4, which may be attractive to some observers. 
Second, these are the only patterns consistent with the preceding axioms. 
In particular, the inverted-U pattern cannot be generated from the 
preceding properties. 
It remains to extend the inequality ordering to the end-points * = 0 
and * = 1. If we adopt the Lorenz axioms, we obtain two additional 
restrictions on the inequality orderings. One restriction, arising from the 
transfer principle, is that a situation in which everyone has the same 
income must be regarded as more equal than any situation in which 
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Figure 10.5 The Imin class of inequality rankings 
incomes differ. Accordingly, the Lorenz properties require that a situa-
tion of equally distributed incomes be deemed a "most equal point." The 
other restriction, arising from the income homogeneity principle, is that 
all equally distributed incomes be deemed "most equal points." If we 
adopt a natural normalization - that most equal points have no 
inequality - we then have 
I(Y/n, Y/n,...Y/n) = 0 
for all total income amounts Y. 
The concept of a most equal point accords with the notions intro-
duced earlier of elitism of the rich and isolation of the poor. Suppose 
that two incomes are possible but that everybody has one of those 
incomes and nobody has the other. In one case, there is no elitism of 
the rich, because there are no rich; and in the other case, there is no 
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Figure 10.6 The IL classes of inequality rankings 
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isolation of the poor, because there are no poor. One would be inclined 
to say that a situation where all are equally rich or equally poor is more 
equal than a situation where some are rich and some are poor and that 
the two situations ("all rich" and "all poor") have the same inequality as 
one another. Inequality notions in the It, /£, and I^in classes make these 
judgments. 
Combining these judgments with the alternative enlargement patterns 
as depicted in figures 10.3 through 10.5, we obtain the three inequality 
orderings It, I+, and I^in shown in figures 10.6a-6c respectively. All are 
Lorenz consistent, yet they treat high income sector enlargement in very 
different ways. 
Note, too, that the familiar inverted U-shaped pattern shown in figure 
10.6d cannot be generated from the preceding axioms. A different 
justification is needed. I shall not pursue that here. 
Inequality measures and inequality 
Any relative inequality relation such as those considered on p. 236 
determines which of two income vectors X, Y e Z is more equal than the 
other. An inequality function /(-)which assigns a real number r to Xand 
Y representing the inequality of that vector such that I(X) and /(Y) are 
ordered by the usual greater than or equal to relation > is said to be an 
inequality measure (alternatively, a "numerical inequality measure" or an 
"inequality index"). A relative inequality measure has the additional 
property that an equiproportionate change in everyone's income leaves 
inequality unchanged. 
Some relative inequality measures are Lorenz consistent (meaning that 
they make precisely those judgments specified by the Lorenz properties 
whenever Lorenz comparisons can be made) and some are not, either 
because they are only weakly Lorenz consistent (meaning that if one 
Lorenz curve lies partly above but not below another, the measure may 
rank the two distributions as equally unequal) or because they are 
Lorenz inconsistent (meaning that there may be a case in which one 
distribution Lorenz dominates another and yet the measure deems the 
first distribution to be more unequal than the second). Among those 
known to be Lorenz consistent are the Gini coefficient, Theil's two 
measures, Atkinson's index, and the coefficient of variation. Among 
those known not to be Lorenz consistent are some which are only weakly 
Lorenz consistent (income share of the richest X% or poorest Y%) and 
others which are Lorenz inconsistent (including the mean absolute 
deviation and the logarithm of the variance of incomes). Lorenz consis-
tent inequality measures are emphasized hereafter. 
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It will be said that an inequality measure measures inequality, or 
equivalently, that the inequality measure is consistent with a specified 
ranking, when the ordinal ranking assigned by the inequality measure 
matches the ordinal ranking of inequality assigned by the observer. All 
that can be hoped for is agreement on conditional statements of the type: 
"For all those whose inequality notions are of such and such type, such 
and such inequality measures measure inequality (and such and such 
other inequality measures do not)." 
Consider now the process of high income sector enlargement on the 
domain of two incomes, as analyzed on pp. 235-44. It was shown in 
Fields (1993), building on the work of Anand and Kanbur (1993), that 
each of six commonly used inequality measures (Theil's entropy index, 
Theil's second measure, CV2, Atkinson index, Gini coefficient, non-
overlapping case, and log variance) starts at zero, increases continuously 
to an interior maximum at $*, and then decreases to zero.12 
Thus, Theil's entropy index, Theil's second measure, the CV2, the 
Atkinson index, and the Gini coefficient (non-overlapping case) are 
Lorenz consistent and follow an inverted U-shaped pattern in high 
income sector-enlargement growth.13 These commonly used measures 
therefore go beyond the Lorenz ordering in a way that produces a similar 
pattern of rankings (the inverted U-pattern).14 
Turning now to the question of symmetry, it is sometimes said that 
on the two-income domain, inequality should reach a turning point 
when half the population is in the high income group and half in the 
low income group, i.e. at $* = 1/2. Do the five Lorenz consistent 
inequality measures considered above have this property? It can be 
shown by numerical example that the answer is "no." Those who 
believe that inequality should increase until half the population is in the 
high income group and decrease thereafter might find this result 
disturbing. 
There is, though, an inequality measure that follows the inverted U-
shaped pattern and does turn at # = 1/2, namely, the log variance. It, 
however, is not Lorenz consistent. 
These five commonly used inequality measures (excluding the log 
variance, which is not Lorenz consistent) all belong to the same subclass, 
namely, the /^ax subclass depicted in figure 10.6d. Is it possible to 
construct Lorenz consistent inequality measures possessing the I^n 
pattern depicted in figure 10.6c? The answer is "yes." An example of such 
a measure is: 
/ = (© _ l)° (K+ 1/4 - #(1 - $)) 1~ a 
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where 
&=yH/yL, # e ( 0 , l ) 
= 1, 0 = 0,1 
0 < a < 1 
and 
K>0.15 
This index is but one example of a real-valued function with the desired 
properties. There are many other possible representations, e.g. 
/ ' = ( 0 2 - \)a(K + 1/4 - *(1 - $)) 1 _ Q . It remains to explore the prop-
erties of various alternatives and determine their relative merits. 
Conclusion: do inequality measures measure inequality? 
This chapter has set out different views which prescribe how inequality 
rankings "ought" to behave in certain circumstances. The Lorenz axioms 
have been unchallenged. The contribution of this chapter has been to 
analyze inequality orderings when Lorenz curves cross. 
The findings in this chapter raise two conceptual problems for 
empirical researchers. One problem confronts those who use these 
measures in empirical applications but who have not yet decided which 
enlargement pattern they favor. Use of the standard measures implicitly 
imposes an ordering. Before using one of these measures, the researcher 
should ask whether the ordering imposed (the 1%^ ordering) is the one 
he or she wishes to impose. 
A different problem arises for those of us who believe that inequality 
"should" be highest when most people are in one income group and few 
are in the other. For such observers, the standard measures do not do 
what they "should" do. 
The most important task for future work is to expand the domain to 
allow for intra-group inequality, and for more than two groups. 
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1 Use of the term "income" is purely for verbal convenience. Inequality of 
consumption or of anything else could be treated identically; 
2 But see Fields (1987,1993). 
3 But see Temkin (1986). 
4 Attention here is limited to the ordinal aspects of the problem. 
To avoid possible misunderstanding of the purpose of this chapter, let me 
state explicitly that it is not about the question of when one distribution is 
better than another. Possible criteria for such judgments include comparisons 
of income level and income inequality, the Pareto criterion on the space of 
incomes, the Rawlsian maximin criterion, comparisons of generalized 
Lorenz curves, Kolm's criteria for optimal justice, and various dominance 
criteria. These criteria from welfare economics, as well as others from ethics 
and political philosophy, are reviewed and developed by Sen (forthcoming). 
But all of these criteria are for welfare rankings and this chapter is about 
inequality rankings, on which Sen's earlier work (Sen, 1973) is a classic. 
5 See, for instance, Sen (1973), Atkinson (1983), Foster (1985), and the 
references cited therein. 
6 "Person" stands for whatever recipient unit is relevant, which may be an 
individual, a family, ox per capita. 
7 W h e n * = 0 or 1,0 = 1. 
8 Analysis of this process is of more than academic interest: Simon Kuznets 
won a Nobel Prize in part for showing that the gradual shift of economic 
activity from low income to high income sectors is the essence of modern 
economic growth and for analyzing inequality change under such a process 
(Kuznets, 1955,1966). 
9 Again please remember that the question is "which is more equal?", not 
"which is better?" The great majority of observers rank Yi as better than Y\. 
10 Ranking inequalities using tz. is equivalent to making inequality compar-
isons using four basic properties: anonymity, income homogeneity, popu-
lation homogeneity, and the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle. For details, see 
Dasgupta, Sen and Starrett (1973), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1973), and Fields 
and Fei (1978). Contrary to these relative approaches, Kolm (1976) and 
Eichhorn and Gehrig (1982) are among those who have adopted more 
absolute perspectives on inequality comparisons. For a review of the 
literature on non-relative views, see Ebert (1987). 
11 Aldi Hagenaars liked this approach; we had a long, fruitful talk about it. 
12 Such a result was already known for the Gini coefficient from the work of 
Knight (1976) and Fields (1979) and was implied by work on the coefficient 
of variation by Swamy (1967), on the log variance by Robinson (1976), and 
on the generalized entropy class, the Atkinson index, and the income share 
of the poorest/; percent by Kakwani (1988). 
13 The log variance, although not Lorenz consistent, also follows an inverted 
U-shaped pattern. 
14 A higher value of Atkinson's inequality aversion parameter e produces a 
smaller value of $*. As e —> oo, the Atkinson index produces peak inequality 
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at $ = l/n, thus representing the /^--ordering. I am grateful to Tony 
Atkinson for pointing this out to me. 
15 L > 0 guarantees that / > 0 for all 3>, in particular, at the interior minimum. 
The necessity of including such a parameter was first pointed out to me by 
Aldi Hagenaars and James Foster. 
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